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A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
SURFACE OWNER CONSENT PROVISIONS
IN THE TENNESSEE SURFACE MINING
LAW AND THE WEST VIRGINIA OIL AND
GAS CONSERVATION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972 the West Virginia Legislature amended chapter 22 of
the state code, pertaining to mines and minerals, by adding arti-
cle 4A, which relates generally to the conservation of oil and gas.'
The legislature declared that the public policy of the state was to
encourage the maximum recovery of oil and gas resources and to
protect the rights of both operators and royalty owners.2 To
achieve these ends, section 7(a) provides for the establishment of
drilling units,' while section 7(b) allows for the pooling of sepa-
rate tracts and interests in the drilling unit, and even allows
forced (or involuntary) pooling in certain instances." The estab-
lishment of drilling units limits the number of wells which may be
drilled, consequently retrenching the costs of production. Consid-
ering the large capital investment required to drill a deep well,
limiting the number of wells to that which is reasonably necessary
to achieve maximum recovery results in a quicker return on in-
vestment. The Act thus encourages maximum production of the
' Act of March 9, 1972, ch. 69, 1972 W. VA. AcTs 424 (codified at W. VA. Coos
§§ 22-4A-1 to -15 (1978 Replacement Vol.)).
2 W. VA. CoDE § 22-4A-l(a) (1978 Replacement Vol.) provides:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State and in the
public interest to:
(1) Foster, encourage and promote exploration for and development,
production, utilization and conservation of oil and gas resources;
(2) Prohibit waste of oil and gas resources and unnecessary surface loss
of oil and gas and their constituents;
(3) Encourage the maximum recovery of oil and gas; and
(4) Safeguard, protect and enforce the correlative rights of operators
and royalty owners in a pool of oil or gas to the end that each such
operator and royalty owner may obtain his just and equitable share of
production from such pool of oil or gas.
3 Id. § 22-4A-7(a).
4 Id. § 22-4A-7(b).
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mineral while at the same time it inhibits economic waste and
unnecessary displacement of surface land areas for use as drilling
sites.
The requirement that a well not be drilled within a minimum
distance from any boundary of the drilling unit protects the vari-
ous owners and operators by assuring that no' one will produce or
receive more than his just and equitable share of the field's pro-
duction. Pooling tracts and interests in the drilling unit assures
recovery of the resources and provides for a 'pro rata share of the
profits by the various owners- and operators, while the number of
deep wells that may be drilled is kept to a minimum. The provi-
sion for forced pooling prohibits a single owner from standing in
the way of recovery by the other mineral owners in the same de-
posit. Furthermore, by providing that the costs of production be
apportioned on the basis of mineral acreage contributed and that
the profits be similarly shared by all owners of operating inter-
ests, the Act is intended to further public policy.
Certain provisions of the Act, however, pose possible consti-
tutional problems. Section 7(b)(4) provides that a deep well may
not be drilled or thereafter operated on a tract of land unless the
operator obtains for valuable consideration the written consent of
the surface owner.5 This consent requirement, imposed as a con-
5 Id. § 22-4A-7(b) (4) provides:
No drilling or operation of a deep well for the production of oil or gas
shall be permitted upon or within any tract of land unless the operator
shall have first obtained the written consent and easement therefor,
duly acknowledged and place [sic] of record in the office of the county
clerk, for valuable consideration of all owners of the surface of such
tract of land, which consent shall describe with reasonable certainty, the
location upon such tract, of the location of such proposed deep well, a
certified copy which consent and easement shall be submitted by the
operator to the commission.
Oklahoma has a similar unitization statute, but with the significant difference
that the Oklahoma Unitization Act does not require the unit operator to acquire
the consent of the surface owner prior to the commencement of drilling opera-
tions. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 287.1 -.15 (West 1969). In Nelson v. Texaco Inc.,
525 P.2d 1263 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) the plaintiff contended that the Oklahoma
statute required the operator to obtain an easement from the surface owner prior
to developing the unit. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals found that
[i]f the plaintiff's contentions were upheld, the whole intent and pur-
pose of the unitization law... could be defeated by one or more recal-
citrant surface owners within a unit area .... [T]he Unit Operator has
[Vol. 821386
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dition to the operator's exercise of his right to extract the miner-
als, might easily be found to violate the taking clause of the fifth
amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.' These questions, al-
though once specifically presented to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, 7 nonetheless presently remain undecided since
the court dismissed the case on other grounds, declining to rule
on the constitutionality of section 7(b)(4). The consent provision
also appears to contravene West Virginia common law whereby a
mineral owner is entitled to those surface rights which are "fairly
necessary" for the enjoyment of the mineral estate.8
At this juncture it is useful to note that this is not a unique
the right to use any surface within the unit for the purpose of efficiently
carrying out the approved unit plan, so long as such use is reasonable
and not unduly burdensome to any particular surface area.
525 P.2d at 1266.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[No] private property
[shall] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No State shall... de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
The fifth amendment taking clause is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Madisonville
Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); Missouri Pac. Ry.
v. Nebraska ex rel. Bd. of Transp., 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Fallbrock Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
7 Traverse Corp. v. Latimer, 157 W. Va. 855, 205 S.E.2d 133 (1974). In La-
timer, the petitioner was denied an application for a drilling permit because, inter
alia, he had failed to obtain the written consent and easement from the surface
owner. On appeal, the petitioner argued that § 22-4A-7(b)(4), if applicable to peti-
tioner's drilling of a test well, was an unconstitutional deprivation of private prop-
erty without due process of law. Without ruling on the constitutional issue, the
court based its affirmation of the denial of the application upon a finding that the
dispute was governed by a contract between the parties.
8 Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950). The
reasoning of the court in Adkins was based on Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307,
121 S.E. 90 (1924), wherein the plaintiff owned the coal, oil, and gas underlying
the leasehold and was engaged in coal mining operations. The owner of a subdivi-
sion on the surface was hindering the operations by refusing to allow passage of
equipment over the subdivision. In granting the injunction that the plaintiff
sought, the court held that when property is granted, all of the means to obtain it
and all of the benefits of it are granted as well. The use of the surface involved in
Adkins and Squires was held to be not only a reasonable burden on the surface
owner, but "fairly necessary" for the development and operation of the mineral
estate.
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approach in the attempt to balance the interests of mineral own-
ers with those of the surface estate. For instance, the Tennessee
General Assembly has enacted a similar consent provision as part
of the Tennessee Surface Mining Law.9 The comparable Tennes-
see statute provides that an application for a surface mining per-
mit shall not be granted without evidence of the operator's legal
right to surface mine the coal.10 However, in the event that the
deed, lease, or other document which severed the surface and
mineral estates does not specifically provide for surface mining,
then evidence of such a legal right must be in the form of an affi-
davit by the current surface owner consenting to the removal of
the coal by surface mining techniques.11
I TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 58-1540 to -1564 (Cur. Supp. 1979).
10 Id. § 58-1544 provides in pertinent part:
No operator shall engage in surface mining without having first obtained
from the commissioner a permit therefore.
(a) The granting of such permit shall... be subject to... submission
of the following information:
(6)(B) Evidence of the operator's legal right to surface mine the miner-
als on the land affected by the permit. If the surface estate has been
severed from the mineral estate, such evidence may be provided by ei-
ther, (a) a deed, lease, or other document which severs the mineral
rights and expressly permits the removal of minerals by surface mining
or a certified extract of the appropriate provisions of such documents; or
(b) a deed, lease or conveyance which severs the mineral rights without
specific provisions for surface mining and an accompanying affidavit by
the current surface estate owner agreeing to the removal of such miner-
als by surface mining. The provisions of this subdivision (B) shall only
apply to mineral estates in coal.
"1 Where the instrument severing the surface and mineral estates was exe-
cuted prior to a time when surface mining had become a known mining method in
the area, the surface mining operator may be precluded under contract law from
commencing surface mining operations without the prior consent of the current
surface owner. For cases disallowing surface mining as not within the contempla-
tion of the parties when the severance was executed because it had not been
known in the area, see Skevolcoki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313
N.E.2d 374 (1974) (surface mining not known in area when severance occurred);
Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973); Wilkes-Barre Twp. School
Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961) (surface mining not known in area
at the time of an 1893 severance); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119
N.E.2d 688 (1954) (unknown method at time of 1905 severance); West Virginia-
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832,42 S.E.2d 46 (1947) (surface mining
rights were not conveyed in a 1904 severance).
For cases allowing surface mining despite the fact that it was not practiced in
the area at the time of the severance, see Roberts v. Twin Fork Coal Co., 222 F.
4
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In those situations where the instrument which severs the
surface and mineral estates does not specifically provide for sur-
face mining, the Tennessee statute poses the same constitutional
problem as the consent provision in the West Virginia oil and gas
statute. To obtain the requisite consent, the mineral owner/opera-
tor is forced to pay further compensation to the owner of the sur-
face estate. In effect, the operator is required to pay a second
time in order to gain the rights for which he has already paid the
surface owner or his predecessor in title.12 Of even greater con-
cern is the possibility that the operator may be entirely precluded
from recovering the minerals if the surface owner refuses to give
his consent at any price.
II. THE LAW CONTROLLING THE TAKING ISSUE
Courts have long recognized that an exercise of governmental
power which results in a diminution of value for the private prop-
erty owner and in turn gives the government a property interest
which it previously did not enjoy constitutes a taking and re-
quires the payment of just compensation. s As the taking doctrine
began to develop in the latter part of the 19th century, only gov-
ernmental actions which constituted physical acquisitions of pri-
Supp. 752 (E.D. Ky. 1963); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568
(1960) (involving an 1855 severance). In Fisher the court stated,
Where a way is granted or reserved without any limitation as to its use,
it will not necessarily be confined to the purposes for which the land was
used at the time the way was created, but may be used for any purpose
to which the land accommodated by the way may naturally and reason-
ably be devoted .... The grantee is entitled to vary his mode of en-
joying the same, and from time to time to avail himself of modern in-
ventions if by so doing he can more fully exercise and enjoy or carry out
the object for which the way was granted.
364 Pa. at 427, 72 A.2d at 570 (quoting from Dowgiel v. Reid, 359 Pa. 448, 453, 59
A.2d 115, 118 (1948) and from 28 C.J.S. Easements § 87 (1941)).
For an extensive analysis of this point see Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 383 (1976).
1! See, e.g., Department for Natural Resources & Envt'l Protection v. No. 8
Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Ky. 1975).
18 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1165, 1226-1229 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964); 1 NiCHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 1.42(1) (3d ed. 1962).
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vate property were held to be takings. Under this early approach,
developed by Justice Harlan, a taking was found only when gov-
ernmental action diminished the private owner's quantum of
property interests and in turn increased the government's quan-
tum of property interests. 1' The attention to physical acquisition
continues to be important in the latest United States Supreme
Court opinions: "A taking may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical in-
vasion by government ... than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good."15 However, the West
Virginia and Tennessee statutes are not physical invasions of pri-
vate property interests by the government. While the provisions
interfere with the mineral owner's and operator's private property
interests, they do not increase the quantum of the state's prop-
erty interests.
The statutes are thus more appropriately viewed as regulat-
ing the use of private property rather than as effecting actual ac-
quisitions. While in a wide variety of instances, the government
may execute laws that adversely affect recognized economic val-
ues, 6 such provisions are also subject to constitutional scrutiny,
and it is a well settled principle that "while property may be reg-
ulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be rec-
ognized as a taking."17 Since there is no set formula for determin-
ing when a regulation becomes a taking, the inquiry is largely
dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. 18 Al-
though courts do attach particular significance to the character of
the governmental action, and may thus more readily find a taking
in the case of an actual physical acquisition than in the imposi-
tion of a regulatory control under an attempted exercise of the
police power, they are further concerned in the latter case with
the nature and extent of the interference in the individual's rights
in the affected property.1'
A regulation will ultimately be found to constitute a taking if
4 Sax, supra note 13, at 36-39.
1B Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Is Id.
17 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
15 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
19 Id. at 130-31.
1390 [Vol. 82
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it cannot be said to be a reasonable exercise of the police power.
Although a proper exercise of the police power must relate to the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public,20 this find-
ing is not determinative. The economic impact of the regulation
on the owner's rights in the affected property is an additional
consideration.2 1 A statute, furthermore, may not under the guise
of the police power impose an abritrary or unreasonable restric-
tion upon the use of private property. The regulation must fur-
ther a public purpose,22 and in this regard the court must look to
the actual purpose of the provision s.2  The general, enumerated
statement of purpose2 4 is given some weight but is not determina-
10 Whether the taking of private property will accomplish the end proposed,
and whether the taking is beneficial to the public are legislative questions. State
ex rel. Ashworth v. State Road Comm'n, 147 W. Va. 430, 128 S.E.2d 471 (1962);
State ex rel Schroath v. Condry, 139 W. Va. 827, 83 S.E.2d 470 (1954); State ex
rel. United Fuel Gas Co. v. DeBerry, 130 W. Va. 418,43 S.E.2d 408 (1947). Conse-
quently, the role of the judiciary in determining whether the taking is for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); United
States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946); Old Dominion Land Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925). As long as a legislative classification is fairly
debatable, it is not wholly arbitrary and will be given great deference by the
courts. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Here the legislative determination that requiring the consent of the surface
owner furthers maximum recovery of oil and gas resources and curbs the adverse
affects of surface mining is not fairly debatable. Rather, it is wholly arbitrary.
A finding of public purpose will not be defeated simply because the regulation
confers an ancillary or incidental private benefit. Washington-Summers, Inc. v.
City of Charleston, 439 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. W. Va. 1977). Thus the substantial
benefit to the individual surface owner standing alone is not determinative of the
absence of a public purpose behind the regulations. Where there is no public pur-
pose to be found, however, the regulation is wholly arbitrary and beyond the scope
of the police power.
21 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
n Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); State ex rel. Coburn v.
Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973); Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W.
Va. 426, 95 S.E.2d 832 (1956).
23 See, e.g., Department for Natural Resources & Envt'l Protection v. No. 8
Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Ky. 1975). In reaching its conclusion as to whether a
use is public, the court is not bound by the designation of the use in the statute,
but may look to the statute as a whole to discover its dominant purpose. Id.
'4 The statements of purpose here are found in W. VA. CODE § 22-4A-l(a)
(1978 Replacement Vol.), reprinted at note 2, supra, and, for the Tennessee law,
in TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1542 (Cum. Supp. 1979), which provides in pertinent
1980] 1391
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tive in such an inquiry. When a particular provision bears no rela-
tion to the ends specified in the statute, reason dictates that the
legislature had some unmentioned purpose in mind when it in-
cluded the provision. In addition, even if the regulation can fairly
be said to be directed toward such a public purpose, this only
means that it falls within the scope of the police power. This find-
ing, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain the regulation, since
an exercise of the police power must be reasonable in order to be
valid.25 Thus, while the purpose may be valid, further inquiry is
necessary regarding the availability and effectiveness of less dras-
tic steps to achieve the same purpose.
Furthermore, even though a particular regulation is a reason-
able exercise of the police power, it may still constitute a taking if
its economic impact on the private property owner goes too far.2"
Diminution in value of private property is an important factor in
determining this question.2 7 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
Justice Holmes states, "One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act."2 More recently, the Court has similarly held that while a
comparison of values before and after is relevant, though not con-
clusive, a regulation can be so onerous as to amount to a taking.29
It is not enough that substantial harm results from the prohibi-
tion against existing beneficial uses, since courts will further in-
quire into possible benefits to be derived from uses which are still
part:
The general assembly finds that the unregulated surface mining of min-
erals can cause soil erosion and landslides, stream pollution, and ac-
cumulation and seepage of contaminated water; contributes to floods;
impairs the value of land for agricultural or other purposes; affects fish
and wildlife and their habitats; counteracts efforts for the conservation
of soil, water and other natural resources; impairs the owners' rights in
neighboring property; creates fire hazards, and in general creates condi-
tions inimical to life, property and the public welfare so as to require the
exercise of the state's police power in the regulation of surface mining.
'5 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
26 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
27 For a review of Holmes' taking theory, see Sax, supra note 13, at 37.
28 260 U.S. at 413.
219 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
1392 [Vol. 82
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allowed under the regulation.30 However, the economic impact of
a regulation goes too far when the regulation not only bars exist-
ing uses but also precludes every reasonable basis for the owner's
beneficial use and enjoyment of the property.31
1I. DISCUSSION
It is questionable whether the enumerated purpose behind
the West Virginia oil and gas conservation provisions bears a rea-
sonable relation to the requirement that the operator obtain the
written consent of the surface owner before commencing to drill a
deep oil or gas well. Similarly, while the enumerated purpose of
the Tennessee Surface Mining Law is the control of surface min-
ing in order to curb its adverse effects on life, property, and the
public welfare, the existence of a reasonable or substantial rela-
tion between this purpose and the requirement that the operator
obtain the surface owner's consent to surface mine is tenuous at
best.32 While there can be no doubt that promoting maximum re-
covery and conservation of oil and gas resources33 and curbing the
1o Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318, 327 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
31 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3 It is difficult to rationally connect the relation between requiring the sur-
face owner's consent to the drilling of deep wells and the maximum recovery and
conservation of oil and gas resources, or between the requirement of his consent to
surface mining and the curbing of such mining's adverse effects on life, property,
and the public welfare. Even if the consent requirement did bear a reasonable
relation to the supposedly legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such
as those enumerated in the two acts, the availability and effectiveness of measures
with a less drastic impact on the mineral owner and operator would preclude find-
ing a valid exercise of the police power. The availability and effectiveness of less
drastic means to accomplish the purpose behind the general regulatory scheme of
these two acts is demonstrated by a review of their other provisions, particularly
W. VA. CODE § 22-4A-7 (1978 Replacement Vol.) and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 58-
1547, -1548, -1553, -1560, -1561 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
See, e.g., Jones Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 382 P.2d 751 (Okla. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla.
510, 244 P.2d 852 (1952); Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n,
205 Okla. 672, 241 P.2d 363 (1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 938 (1952); Russell
Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 160 Okla. 156, 15 P.2d 125 (1932); Bandini Petroleum
Co. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 123, 293 P. 899 (1930), afl'd, 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
19801 1393
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adverse effects that surface mining34 could cause to life, property
and the public welfare are proper reasons for the exercise of po-
lice power, it is difficult to discern the relation between these
goals and the requirement of the surface owner's consent as a
condition to the operator's right to extract the minerals. The pub-
lic health, safety, morals or general welfare are not in the least bit
enhanced by the surface owner consent requirements found in the
two statutes.35 Though politically expedient, 6 these requirements
simply do not fall within the scope of the police power. Conse-
quently, they are arbitrary impositions upon the mineral owner's
and operator's rights to the beneficial use and enjoyment of their
property, violating the taking clause of the fifth amendment and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 17
This analysis has recently been applied in a neighboring Ap-
palachian state. The Kentucky General Assembly enacted a com-
parable measure which required that an application for a surface
mining permit be accompanied by a statement of consent signed
by each holder of a freehold interest in the surface rights of the
affected land." The declared purpose of the statute, inter alia,
was "to provide such regulation and control of the strip mining of
coal as to minimize or prevent its injurious effects on the people
and resources of the commonwealth."' 9 In 1975, the Court of Ap-
See, e.g., Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 I1.2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582(1981).
Department for Natural Resources & Envt'l Protection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528
S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Ky. 1975). Contra, see Hager v. Commonwealth Dept. of
Envt'l Resources, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 482, 308 A.2d 171 (1973).
36 By making the consent of the surface owner a condition precedent to the
mineral operator's right to extract the minerals, these provisions give the surface
owner predominant control over the mineral owner's enjoyment of his property.
They grant the surface owner more property rights than he is actually entitled to,
while conversely diminishing the mineral owner's property rights.
37Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 133 (1928); Carter v. City of Blue-
field, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va.
456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915).
Ky. REv. STAT. § 350.060(8) (Cum. Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part:
Each application shall ... be accompanied by a statement of consent to
have strip mining conducted upon the area of land described in the ap-
plication for a permit. The statement of consent shall be signed by each
holder of a freehold interest in such land. Each signature shall be nota-
rized. No permit shall be issued if the application therefor is not accom-
panied by a statement of consent.
39 Ky. REv. STAT. § 350.020 (1977 Replacement Vol.) (amended without perti-
1394 [Vol. 82
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peals of Kentucky addressed the constitutionality of this consent
statute in Department for Natural Resources & Environmental
Protection v. No. 8 Ltd.40 The court first noted that the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare could be served by an act
which stood as an environmental conservation measure. It then
reasoned that, under its police power, the General Assembly
could properly strike its own balance between environmental in-
terests and the interests of mineral owners by, for example,
prohibiting surface mining entirely, or by prohibiting surface
mining where tillable soil would be removed from agricultural
production, or limiting surface mining to areas that have less than
a given percentage of grade, or by requiring extensive restoration
or reforestation of the disturbed land, or by limiting the activity
in areas where the watershed and wildlife might be adversely af-
fected or even where aesthetic beauty might be spoiled.4 1 How-
ever, the court probed beyond the declared purpose of the enact-
ment and held that the statute, while ostensibly an
environmental measure, did no more than delegate to private in-
dividuals4 2 a veto power over the use of the land, a power with
indeterminable effect and bearing no definitely rational relation-
nent change in 1978).
40 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975).
41 Id. at 686.
4" The police power is a public power. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976);
Industrial Dev. Auth. v. La France Cleaners & Laundry Corp., 216 Va. 277, 217
S.E.2d 879 (1975); Johnson v. City of Paducah, 512 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1974); Bureau
of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 321 A.2d 748 (Md. 1974); State ex
rel. Coburn v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973); Winters v. Saw-
yer, 225 Tenn. 113, 463 S.W.2d 705 (1971); State v. Stouffer, 28 Ohio App. 2d 229,
276 N.E.2d 651 (1971); Public Service Co. v. Caddo Elec. Co-op., 479 P.2d 572
(Okla. 1970) (police regulation cannot be invoked to protect one class of citizens
against another unless for the protection of society in general).
A law delegating to a private property owner a veto right over land use by
another is not a part of that public power. Obviously, the police power is not
served by the delegation of a discretionary power to a particular private property
owner.
Furthermore, since the consent requirement did not apply to situations in
which the owner of the mineral rights also owned the surface rights nor to those
situations in which the owner of the mineral rights had been previously granted
specific authority to conduct strip mining, then as applied to others it constituted
"an obvious retrospective diminution of rights granted by a specific form of con-
tract bare of any attempt to control the noxious aspects of... strip mining oper-
ation." Department for Natural Resources & Envt'l Protection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528
S.W.2d 684, 685 (Ky. 1975).
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ship to environmental protection.
If the operator is unable to obtain the consent of the surface
owner, as required by these sections, he is barred from extracting
the minerals. As Justice Holmes stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon:
'For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right
to mine it' .... What makes the right to mine coal valuable
is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy-
ing it.43
Certainly the same reasoning applies to oil and gas; the right to
oil and gas consists of the right to drill wells to extract it. When
one is prohibited from mining coal in a commercially practicable
manner or from drilling wells to recover oil and gas, one's estate
in the coal, oil or gas is rendered wholly useless. A regulation
which precludes extracting the minerals would certainly appear to
be so oppressive as to amount to a taking of the mineral owner's
property."
Furthermore, a closer examination of. the consent require-
ments suggests that only private uses and purposes are furthered
by the provisions. Consequently, not only are the restrictions un-
constitutional because they do not provide for the payment of
just compensation, but since they effect takings for private uses,
43 260 U.s. 393, 414 (1922) (partially quoting from Commonwealth v.
Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328, 331, 100 A. 820, 820 (1917)).
44 "[Wihile government may properly diminish values somewhat under the
police power, if the exercise of that power makes the affected property 'wholly
useless,' the right of property would prevail over the public interest, and the po-
lice power would fail." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349
(1908) (Holmes, J.).
Should the operator be able to purchase the consent of the surface owner, he
will then be entitled to extract the minerals, provided there is compliance with the
other provisions of the acts. The regulation would then no longer render the min-
eral estate wholly worthless, but would instead effectively diminish its value by
the amount which the operator pays to secure the surface owner's consent. With-
out consideration of whether this itself is within the scope of the police power, and
whether it is a reasonable exercise of such power, this diminution in value stand-
ing alone would not render the regulation unconstitutional. See generally Andrus
v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318, 327 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
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not even the payment of just compensation can sustain them.
Where the mineral operator cannot obtain the requisite consent
of the surface owner, he is barred from extracting the minerals in
a commercially practicable manner, and the mineral estate is ren-
dered wholly valueless. In such instance the limitation on the ex-
tent to which the police power can be exercised to diminish the
value of property has been exceeded, requiring the use of the
power of eminent domain to achieve the desired statutory goal.
Eminent domain, however, can only be exercised if the mineral
estate is taken for a public use,45 as opposed to use for the private
benefit of the surface owner.
4
While there is a strong presumption that when property is
taken by the state it is taken for a public use,47 it is equally as
certain that a mere declaration of public purpose by the legisla-
ture cannot make a private use a public one.48 The constitutional
protection against the taking of private property for a private use
cannot be evaded by any such declaration, however formal or offi-
cial. In each instance, the question of whether the use is public or
private must be determined by the judiciary from the facts and
circumstances of that case.4 9 But even though the characteriza-
tion of a particular use is ultimately a judicial function, yet if a
particular use is declared by the legislature to be a public one,
45 Supra note 20. See also State ex rel. McMillion v. Stahl, 141 W. Va. 233,
89 S.E.2d 693 (1955); Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R., 182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d
99 (1943); Scott Lumber Co. v. Wolford, 62 W. Va. 555, 59 S.E. 516 (1907).
46 Supra note 20. The taking of private property, by authority of the state,
for a private use is violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
4, "Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclu-
sive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian
of the public needs to be served by social legislation .... The role of
the judiciary in determining whether that power [of eminent domain] is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). See also United States ex rel. TVA v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946).
48 See note 23 supra. A statutory attempt to deprive the courts of the right to
pass upon the question of public use is a nullity. Railroad Co. v. Iron-Works, 31
W. Va. 710, 8 S.E. 453 (1888).
4 State Highway Comm'n v. Batts, 265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965); City
of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal. App. 2d 261, 311 P.2d 135 (1957); Riden v.
Philadelphia B. & W. R.R., 182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1943).
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courts will normally show deference to this declaration unless
they are persuaded otherwise.50
Courts have given "public use" an increasingly expansive
construction and may consider the public use test satisfied by a
taking for the benefit of the public, rather than for a resulting
actual use by the public.51 And while the term public benefit im-
plies use by many, or use by the public, it may be limited to the
inhabitants of a small or restricted locality. 2 Therefore, whether
a use be public or private is determined by the character of the
use, and not by the number of persons who enjoy it. Even so,
however, the use must be in common and not for a particular in-
dividual.53 A merely incidental private use or benefit will not de-
feat the exercise of eminent domain if the primary purpose is a
public one," but conversely, if the dominant purpose is private,
the mere fact that a public use or benefit is also incidentally de-
rived will not warrant the exercise of this sovereign power.55
1* Caretta Ry. v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 62 W. Va. 185, 57 S.E. 401
(1907).
The issue posed to the courts is not whether a use is actually a public one in
the opinion of the court, but whether the legislature could reasonably consider it
public. Shelton v. State Road Comm'n, 113 W. Va. 191, 167 S.E. 444 (1932);
Southern Ry. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662 (1912).
51 Possessary use by the public is not an indispensable pre-requisite to the
lawful exercise of the power of eminent domain, but more than mere common
desirability or indirect public benefit is required. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v.
Port of New York Auth., 17 A.D.2d 590, 237 N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963),
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954); Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 83 (1923); Comment, The Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
52 Pocantico Water-Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N.Y. 249, 259, 29 N.E. 246, 248
(1891).
53 Id.
5 Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Province, 262 U.S. 668 (1923); Pittsburgh & W.
Va. Gas. Co. v. Cutright, 82 W. Va. 42, 97 S.E. 686 (1919); Hendersonville Light &
Power Co. v. Blue Ridge Interurban Ry., 243 U.S. 563 (1917); Union Lime Co. v.
Chicago & N. Ry., 233 U.S. 211 (1914); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Hairson v. Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908);
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Kaukauna Water Power
Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254 (1891).
"I Ryan v. Louisville & N. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 50 S.W. 744 (1899).
See also Annot., 53 A.L.R. 9 (1928) (discusses invoking eminent domain for a com-
bination of public and private uses or purposes).
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These statutes attempt to resolve the conflict between the
owners of the surface estate and the mineral estate by subju-
gating the rights of the latter to those of the former. They bestow
a benefit upon the surface owner. The question presented is
whether this benefit is the dominant purpose for a consent re-
quirement, or whether this private benefit is merely incidental to
a primary, public purpose.
One could argue that the purpose for these statutes is the
improvement of the public condition through the resolution of
conflict between these competing interests within society. If one
accepts this argument, conceivably there is a public purpose be-
hind these statutory provisions. Considering the one-sidedness
and unpredictability of the resolution, however, it is inconceivable
that such a public purpose is the primary motivation behind
these restrictions. The acts elevate the rights of surface owners to
a status of total domination over mineral owners/operators. The
surface owner, by withholding consent, can completely preclude
the mineral owner/operator's enjoyment of his property, or alter-
natively he can extract a fee for the consent, in which case the
mining would occur with no use or benefit having accrued to the
public whatsoever.
Moreover, the consent requirement does not actually resolve
the conflicting interests of the owners of the surface and mineral
estates. Instead, they are purely limitations upon the mineral
owner/operator's use of his property, imposed primarily to benefit
the individual surface owner.56 The private use or benefit which
these statutory provisions yield to the surface owner cannot with
certainty be even incidental to a public purpose. If the operator is
unable to purchase the surface owner's consent, the minerals are
effectively taken, but are put to no use by the public, and
whether the public incidentally benefits would fortuitously de-
pend upon the circumstances of each individual case. On the
other hand, if the operator is able to purchase the surface owner's
consent, the payment inures not to the benefit of the public, but
to the sole use and benefit of the surface owner. Such private ben-
efits would seem to be the primary motivation behind these con-
sent requirements, with the furtherance of environmental protec-
"Department for Natural Resources & Envt'l Protection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528
S.W.2d 684, 686 (Ky. 1975).
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tion a mere incidental public benefit in the event that it occurs at
all.
IV. CONCLUSION
These consent provisions, although they offer a politically ex-
pedient solution from a legislative perspective, suffer rather obvi-
ous and serious constitutional infirmities. Although a great many
legislative efforts in the fields of environmental protection and oil
and gas conservation have been held constitutional, few of those
laws have sought their desired ends in such an obtuse and inci-
dental fashion. In addition, the statutes examined here delegate
to private parties the power to gain potentially major revisions of
vested contract and property rights that traditionally receive spe-
cial protection from the courts, and it is thus doubtful that a
mere recital of a conservational or environmental purpose would
persuade a court-that was confronted with the constitutional is-
sues raised by the application of these laws.
James M. O'Brien
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